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ABSTRACT 
 
Environmental security is generally held to be a contemporary or even futuristic concern. 
However, as with many facets of security thought, this overlooks how the unparalleled 
technological, economic and social changes of the 19th Century forged much of the 
international political landscape we now inhabit. The tendency for ecological political 
enquiry to focus on the rise of ecocentric policy serves to obscure how many aspects of 
national and human security relating to environmental change were apparent in the 19th 
century. Human insecurity in the face of pollution and resource depletion was a part of the 
emergence of ecological science in response to the industrialization of Europe and North 
America.  In addition, this was the era when European imperialism reached its apex and 
European nationalisms fully emerged; both of which contributed to the national 
securitization of the environment around much of the world in contrasting ways as the desire 
to both conquer and preserve nature became more evident. Environmental questions of 
national, human and ecological security are not peculiar to the present age and were very 
much apparent in 19th Century global politics.  
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1. Introduction 
Whilst it is generally held to be a contemporary or even futuristic concern, many of the issues 
of environmental security were very evident during the initial industrialization of Europe and 
North America over a century before their popularization from the 1960s. As with many 
facets of security thought, the ‘securitization’ of environmental issues over the past fifty years 
overlooks how the unparalleled technological, economic and social changes of the 19th 
Century forged much of the international political landscape we now inhabit. Though the 
term ‘environmental security’ is relatively new and still contested, its applicability dates back 
to the onset of the industrial revolution.  
 
Environmental security has diverse meanings; variably invoked to refer to how national or 
human security can be threatened by environmental change or how the environmental itself 
can be rendered insecure.  A conservative, statecentric understanding of the term views it 
as: ‘intersection of environmental and national security considerations at a national policy 
level’(Allenby 2000: 5). From a human security perspective environmental security can be 
defined accordingly: ‘ When people do not have enough options to avoid or adapt to 
environmental change such that their needs, rights and values are likely to be undermined, 
then they can be said to be environmentally insecure’ ( Mathew, Barnett, McDonald & 
O’Brien 2010: 18). From either a human or national security perspective environmental 
security emerged as a concept from the 1990s intended to signify a heightened significance 
for issues of environmental change beyond that already apparent in the politicization of 
nature inherent in the rise of political ecology.   
 
The prevailing wisdom is that, whilst the science of ecology was born in the 1860s, political 
ecology, making the environment the referent object of concern, did not emerge until a 
century later. Ecocentric policies emerged in the aftermath of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring 
in the early 1960s which prompted the restriction of organochlorine pesticides (such as 
dicholoro-diphenyl-trichloroethane DDT) in the US, even though they were profitable and 
useful to man, because of their proven negative effects on several bird species’ (Carson 
1962). As such this appeared to represent a paradigm shift from environmental political and 
legal measures of earlier years which, ultimately, remained anthropocentric in that they 
sought to conserve nature for aesthetic or economic reasons (such as in protecting birds that 
were agriculturally useful in pest control).  
 
Political Ecology is very widely (and maybe universally) held to be an ideology born of the 
1960s and the rise of ecocentrism and, usually, some years after Carson’s breakthrough. 
Robbins distinguishes between political ecology and a much older ‘apolitical ecology’, the 
latter of which is concerned with resource depletion but without addressing the economic 
structures- capitalism and imperialism- that are the principal cause of  problems such as ‘eco-
scarcity’ (Robbins 2011). The term itself is sometimes attributed to an anthropological article 
by Wolf in 1972 (Wolf 1972) though Hoffman & Graham contend that the 1960s was the 
starting point for the ideological approach (Hoffman & Graham  2006: 370-391). Similarly, 
Harrison & Boyd reason that Political Ecology did originate with Carson the 1960s and that 
environmental policy prior to then was more a case of ‘romanticism’ in terms of human 
relations with nature (Harrison & Boyd 2003).  Barry acknowledges some deep roots of 
political ecology in the industrial revolution but argues that the ideology evolved in three 
stages from the 1980s (Barry 2014). Peet & Watts consider that political ecology emerged 
from the 1970s (Peet & Watts 1996; Watts 2013) whilst LeBillon & Duffy concur with Barry 
and believe that it was not until the late 1980s that ecocentric thought truly took form (Le 
Billon & Duffy 2018).  Peet and Watts define political ecology as: ‘a confluence between 
ecologically rooted social sciences and the principals of political economy’ (Peet & Watts 
1996: 6). 
 
 This chronology of ecology This is broadly but not completely accurate. Whilst much 
environmental policy that did emerge in 19th Century  Europe and North America sought to 
conserve nature for human interests (whether economic or aesthetic), some ecocentric (as 
opposed to anthropocentric) protection of biodiversity also occurred. Additionally, the 
assumption that ecocentricism originates in the 1960s is Eurocentric. Oneness with nature is 
long-established in many of the cultures around the world which came to be particularly 
overshadowed by the further advance of European imperial dominance, such as Hindu, native 
American and Inuit. It was hunters from the South who depleted the Arctic’s seals and whales 
in the 18th and 19th Centuries not the indigenous peoples respectful of their prey and schooled 
in the arts of sustainability.  
 
The tendency for enquiry in political ecology to focus on the rise of ecocentric policy serves 
to obscure how many aspects of national and human security relating to environmental 
change were apparent in the 19th century (and, indeed, in the pre-industrialized world). 
Human insecurity in the face of pollution and resource depletion was a part of the emergence 
of the science of ecology and the politics of conservation from the 1860s. Whilst neither 
human security nor environmental security existed as concepts at this time the idea that the 
state had a duty to protect its citizens against environmental harm was apparent. Social 
security was part of the political lexicon of the late 19th Century long before national security 
came to be popularized. Starting in Bismarck’s Germany the idea that people had a right to be 
protected against the negativities of industrialization manifested itself in the emergence of 
state welfarism. Without doubt state welfarism served the national interest since a healthy and 
happy population provided better forces for the factory and the battlefield but human as well 
as state security stood to gain by acting against pollution and resource-depletion. 
 The nineteenth century was also the era when European imperialism reached its apex and 
European nationalisms fully emerged; both of which further contributed to the national 
securitization of the environment in contrasting ways. The romaniticization of the countryside 
in the face of industrialization formed part of many European nationalist movements that 
emerged in this era whilst, at the same time, conquering both nature and ‘pre-modern’ human 
cultures was a component of imperialist expansion outside Europe. This article is a broad 
survey of how environmental change invoked human and national security on the 
international stage long before the recent popularization of this notion. The focus is 
somewhat Eurocentric since Europe dominated the nineteenth century world to an extent 
unparalleled in human history.  Environmental questions of national, human and ecological 
security are not peculiar to the present age and were very much apparent in 19th Century 
global politics. Appreciating the environmental insecurities of the 19th Century helps remind 
us how the meaning of security came to be distorted by the rise of total war in the 20th 
Century. Human insecurity in the face of environmental change far predates the 
popularization of the concepts of human or environmental security in recent decades. 
 
2. The Ontology of Environmental Security  
A primary reason for the notion of environmental security rarely being related to 19th Century 
politics is that there is no agreement on what this concept actually means. Whilst the concept 
has acquired much currency over the past quarter of a century, there is no clear consensus on 
how ‘the environment’ comes to invoke security. Is the referent object to be secured the state, 
‘the human’ or the environment?  
The question of whether environmental problems merit the politically significant label of ‘se-
curity’ is a complex one and highly contested. In essence there are four positions that have 
evolved:  
i, Traditional International Relations Realists reject the coupling together of the environment 
and security either or both because environmental degradation is not considered significant 
enough to merit such a label and the contention that the politics of ‘security’ is about the mili-
tary defence of the state, not tackling problems of biodiversity or pollution (Mearsheimer 
2001).   
ii, Security Wideners consider that environmental challenges can invoke the politics of secu-
rity but only if they can be seen to cause wars or threaten the sovereignty of states. The con-
tention that ‘water wars’ could be triggered by the increased scarcity of that most precious of 
resources is a prominent example (Homer-Dixon 1994; Kaplan 1994). Beyond linking re-
source depletion and traditional national security concerns, however, there is little appetite for 
environmental security in this approach: ‘it is not exactly clear, for instance, how military 
forces can help reduce the build–up of greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere to prevent global 
warming’ (Wirtz 2007: 339).,   
iii, Traditional Political Ecologists resist ‘securitization’ through concerns that this risks in-
voking inappropriate, militaristic ‘national security’ responses to complex environmental 
problems. In most countries ‘security’ has come to be synonymous with military defence. 
Since militarism is environmentally-damaging and serves to distract political attention from 
other important issues most political ecologists see this as inherently problematic (Deudney 
1990). The green roots of political ecology lie in the social rather than political sciences. It is 
an approach born of the critical turn in anthropology, development studies and political econ-
omy rather than political theory or International Relations. Blaikie and Brookfield argue that: 
‘the phrase “political ecology” combines the concerns of ecology and a broadly defined polit-
ical economy. Together this encompasses the constantly shifting dialectic between society 
and land-based resources, and also within classes and groups within society itself ’(Blaikie 
and Brookfield 1987: 17). The focus of political ecologists who emerged from the 1980s was 
land ownership, economic structures and conflict in a much wider sense than inter-state wars.   
In contrast, the roots of environmental security lie very much in international relations schol-
arship which, traditionally at least, is a discipline that critical social scientists tend to distance 
themselves from as being politically conservative, statecentric and methodologically positiv-
ist (Zwierlein 2018). The emergence and popularization of the resource wars approach (in-
cluding its ‘real world’ influence on governments such as in Washington and London) served 
to reinforce this perception. However, this also served to blind mainstream political ecology 
to emergent human security approaches keen to embrace environmental concerns and move 
IR beyond conservative statecentricism. In addition, the focus on ‘who gets what’ in terms of 
land and resources tended not to consider the wider public health consequences of pollution 
and environmental change that were accommodated in the human security approach (Peet & 
Watts 1996). 
iv, Human & Critical Security International Relations Scholars, receptive to the ontological 
and epistemological challenges to the conventions of the discipline that emerged following 
the end of the Cold War, contend that environmental problems can and should be ‘securit-
ized’ by abandoning the traditional preoccupation with the state and military defence and mo-
bilizing global responses to different kinds of threats to life. In this view securitization does 
not have to mean ‘sending in the troops’. Rather, it can mean giving life-threatening issues 
like ozone depletion or climate change the same level of political prioritization traditionally 
given to military defence (Dalby 2002; Mathew et al 2010, Hough 2014).   
Hence today the concept of environmental security is viewed as unwelcome on both sides of 
the ‘political ecology spectrum’. Traditionalists in IR and Political Ecology both resist ‘envi-
ronmental securitization’ in principle. Given this it is unsurprising that the emergence of the 
science of ecology and politics of conservation amidst the industrialization of Europe and 
North America has rarely also been considered the breeding ground of environmental secu-
rity. However, from either a widened or human security perspective, environmental change in 
the 19th Century world was highly relevant in a number of ways that will now be discussed.   
3. The Rise of Ecology 
The science of understanding matters of environmental change emerged in the nineteenth 
century and was given the name ecology by the German Biologist Haeckel in 1866 (Haeckel 
1866). Ecological science brought recognition of natural systemic phenomena linking dispar-
ate life forms such as food chains, the carbon cycle and evolution and an understanding of 
humanity’s place within the environment. As with environmental or human security, though, 
the crystallization of the terminology followed the evolution of understanding the phenome-
non. The rise of botanical studies and forest management in the 18th Century advanced eco-
logical understanding as did many other studies of the human place in the world dating back 
to ancient Greece. Two years before this first usage of the term ecology US diplomat George 
Perkins Marsh had penned the landmark Man and Nature, widely regarded as the first eco-
logical book in that it used empirical data to prove the negative effects of human activity on 
woodlands and waterways. Drawing on research Marsh carried out whilst serving as the US 
ambassador to Italy, Man and Nature begins with an overview of how much of the forested 
and fertile Roman Empire had gradually become unproductive arid wasteland, through over-
production. Hence Marsh was discussing desertification over half a century before the term 
came to be employed. The book was also ahead of its time in foreseeing the links between de-
forestation and flooding. Whilst Man and Nature is more of a scientific than political work, 
in examining the effects of major engineering projects and urbanization on nature and ques-
tioning their legitimacy there is no doubt that Marsh’s observations on the changing Euro-
pean landscape sowed the seeds of Political Ecology and environmental security (Marsh 
1864). Marsh’s analysis lacks the political economy focus favoured by political ecologists a 
century later but his appeal for human activities to be curtailed for nature’s and humanity’s 
sake is a political call that is both ecocentric and environmentally-anthropocentric.  
 
In the wake of this scientific revolution of the 1860s pressure groups campaigning for 
conservation began to emerge in the US and Western Europe. The British Royal Society for 
the Protection of Birds (RSPB) became the world’s first conservation pressure group when it 
was founded in 1889, through fears that grebe birds were in danger of extinction due to the 
fashion of using their feathers for hats. Ten years later, Naturschutzbind Deutsch (German 
Union for Nature Conservation NABU) was founded in similar circumstances, though it 
evolved to also promote the protection of flora and fauna other than birds. In the US the 
Sierra Club, founded in 1892 by Scots-born John Muir, sought to build upon the idea of 
designated conservation zones to protect the natural environment established by the 
government twenty years earlier with the world’s first national park at Yellowstone. These 
conservation organizations, and others formed in this period like the UK’s National Trust, 
remain highly influential today.  
 
The origins of international policy on issues of environmental change can also be traced back 
as far as the era of as-then unparalleled industrialization and globalization that was the late 
nineteenth century. Possibly the first formal international treaty conserving fauna was the 
1876 Jan Mayen Seal Fishery agreement by which the Dutch, British, Germans, Russians, 
Norwegians and Swedes, mindful that they would soon exhaust supplies, agreed to 
geographical and seasonal restrictions on seal hunting in the Arctic Ocean east of Greenland. 
The first international treaty dealing with flora evolved between 1878 and 1889 with France, 
Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland 
agreeing to cooperate in order to prevent the spread of the disease phylloxera in grapes. A 
Treaty seeking to avert overfishing was also ratified by all of the North Sea states in 1882 and 
similar agreements were made for salmon fisheries, the Rhine states in 1885 and Russia, 
Norway and Sweden for the Tome River (which runs along the Finnish-Swedish border) in 
1897. The Convention for the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture, ratified by 8 
European states- including France and Germany- in 1902, then became the first international 
legal instrument on non-marine animal conservation (Hough 2014: 3-5; Kaufman 2018: 12-
16).  
 
These domestic and international agreements were motivated principally by economic rather 
than environmental concerns. Internationally traded foods and wine were at stake in ratifying 
the treaties rather than the flora and fauna themselves. The grapes, birds and fish being 
protected were the subject of such concern because of their instrumental rather than intrinsic 
value. Similarly, the blossoming of international conservation policy in North America in the 
early 20th century, seen with the emergence of the North Pacific Fur Seal Convention (1911) 
and Migratory Birds Treaty (1916), was a result of US and Canadian public opinion 
mobilizing by a combination of aesthetics and economics (Dorsey 1998). This distinction  is 
the key to determining whether a political issue is truly ecological (Political Ecologists 
generally prefer this term to ‘environmental’ since that can be thought to imply that the non-
human world is a backdrop to the human world rather than the two co-exiting in a single 
ecosystem). In determining whether a given issue is an ecological one the key question is ‘is 
the environment to be protected for its own sake or just when this furthers human interests’? 
Hence conventional wisdom has it that ecocentric environmental politics did not emerge until 
the 1960s when legislation began to be drafted to protect nature for its own sake rather than 
for human interests. The restriction of the insecticide dichloro-diphenyl-trichlorethane (DDT) 
in the US when it became apparent that it was poisoning birds (and not just those ‘useful to 
agriculture’), even though the chemical had been hugely successful in terms of increasing 
food yields and curbing malaria, is often cited as a particular watershed.  
 
This analysis and timeline of environmentalism, whilst broadly true, is over-simplified. 
Ecocentricism and environmental security did emerge in 19th century Europe and North 
America a century before their full appreciation. Ecology in the 19th Century was mainly 
scientific but also occasionally political. Likewise policy in this era was mainly 
anthropocentric but also, occasionally, ecocentric. Despite his influence on Roosevelt and 
association with national parks established primarily for human hunting and aesthetic 
interests John Muir was far more than a conservationist and his work fiercely critiqued 
anthropocentricism: ‘Why should man value himself as more than a small part of the one 
great unit of creation’ (Muir 1916: 139). Muir was a preservationist protecting  nature from 
man rather than form him and, as such, can more clearly be linked to contemporary political 
ecologists and an approach to environmental security that makes the environment to referent 
object of security.  
 
Marsh also was clearly more than a part-time scientist and saw his literary work as 
contributing to the political world he inhabited: ‘The great question, whether man is of nature 
or above her’ (Marsh 1864: 549). The same is true of many of the other great environmental 
pioneers of that age. Often referred to as ‘England’s first environmentalist’, the influential 
naturalist Gilbert White also expressed the ecocentricism and holism of contemporary 
political ecologists. White’s work emphasized the importance of all creatures and not just 
those useful or attractive to humanity.  Similarly, great European thinkers of the age, like Von 
Humboldt and Morris, considered later, were more direct predecessors of contemporary 
ecological thought than is often recognized (White 1900) Van Humboldt & 1819: Morris 
1888). The grebes that prompted the launch of the RSPB were not particularly useful to man 
and it is not the case that 19th Century conservation thought and policy was purely a product 
of “huntin’, shootin’, fishin’” elitists as is often assumed. 
 
In particular, environmental concerns of the 19th Century often also became prominent 
because they had human and national security implications. The focus on ecocentrism over 
anthropocentricism in ecological thought tends to obscure this. Anthropocentrism is still very 
relevant in environmental policy today. The most prominent environmental issues today- 
climate change, ozone depletion or atmospheric pollution-  are so principally because of their 
human rather than non-human significance. Such anthropocentric environmental policy can 
easily be reconciled with national or human security. Nineteenth century Europe and North 
America was the scene of much anthropocentric conservation policy enacted in the interests 
of elite aesthetics or recreation but also of anthropocentric policy tackling pollution and 
sustainability in order to alleviate human suffering and enhance state order.  
 
The paternalism, nationalism and imperialism that explains 19th Century environmental 
change and also the political responses to it is not palatable to most contemporary political 
ecologists. Nevertheless, we can observe, in a number of ways, that environmental security 
was invoked in 19th Century Europe and North America: i) In domestic politics as a counter-
response to industrialization and ii) in international politics in the context of sustaining 
imperial rule, both informed by scientific advances in the appreciation of the natural world.  
 4. Environmental Securitization via scientific advance and 
industrialization 
The two principal reasons behind the rise of political ecology in the 1960s and the subsequent 
securitization of the environment were concerns over two collective goods problems that 
challenged the atomistic state system: resource depletion and transboundary pollution. Fears 
of overpopulation and the related concern of key resources, like foodstuffs and oil, coming to 
be depleted challenged the whole established premise that states should focus on their own 
economic growth. At the same time, recognition that the polluting costs of industrial 
development could be incurred by countries not responsible for the emissions served to move 
such decisions beyond a national cost-benefit analysis. However, these political dilemmas did 
not suddenly manifest themselves in the 1960s. Both of these challenges had previously 
become very much apparent during the industrialization and proto-globalization of the 
nineteenth century. Contrary to much popular appreciation, acid rain, climate change and 
overpopulation were apparent and appreciated in the 19th Century world.  
 
4.1 Resource depletion 
The first well-known expression of concern that the Earth’s resources were finite and threat-
ened by overpopulation came at the end of the 18th century with the publication of ‘An Essay 
on the Principle of Population’ by the British economist Thomas Malthus. Malthus reasoned 
that famines would become more commonplace as resources- particularly food- would soon 
be exceeded since: ‘[T]he power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the 
earth to produce subsistence for man’ (Malthus 1798: 23-24). Whilst famines did indeed 
blight the 19th Century world, this Malthusian equation never manifested itself but not be-
cause his line of argument was flawed. The world’s population and resource consumption 
grew at rates greater than ever in history((from 990 million in 1800 to 1.65 billion in 1900 
Roser, Ritchie & Ortiz-Ospina 2019)) but so did its food supply as a result of the Industrial 
Revolution, which served to increase crop yields and also improve resource extraction. Not-
withstanding this illustration of human ingenuity overcoming a potential environmental 
threat, early resource scarcity fears nevertheless did come to manifest themselves in other di-
mensions in the nineteenth century world.  
 
In 1968 the ‘Neo-Malthusian’ US Ecologist Garrett Hardin popularised a cautionary parable 
first aired in the nineteenth century by the British Economist William Forster-Lloyd on the 
finite quality of shared resources, known as the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’. Forster-Lloyd 
described how the traditional English village green, conventionally open to all villagers, had 
become endangered because of an abuse of the privilege by the villagers in overgrazing their 
cattle. As the practise had gone on for centuries it had been assumed that it always could but 
it had emerged that an increase in the number of cattle above an optimum level was eroding 
the land and ruining the common resource for all (Forster-Lloyd 1873).  
 
Common woodlands became analogous to Forster-Lloyd’s village greens as the increased 
strain on the key resource of timber became a widespread concern across all of industrializing 
Europe. That this came to be viewed as a matter of national security is evidenced by promi-
nent state interventions in the face of these tragedy of the commons scenarios. A National 
Board of Forestry was created in Finland in 1859 bringing much of the country’s vast wood-
lands, previously considered common land, under state control. In 1886 the Forest Act then 
sought to make the timber industry sustainable. In Russia, which at that time was Finland’s 
imperial ruler, deforestation also prompted a nationalization of nature in the face of a timber 
shortage. Unlike Germany or Britain Russia did not industrialize until the 20th century but ex-
perienced profound social change in the late nineteenth century owing to the abolition of serf-
dom by Czar Alexander II in 1861. The Serfs had previously worked the woodlands on a 
small-scale basis but their liberation had seen logging companies take over and feed a grow-
ing demand for timber at home and abroad. As with the Finnish policy, the 1888 Resolution 
on the Preservation of Forests brought in the widespread state control of woodlands and ac-
tions seeking to make the industry sustainable. Also introduced were further measures aiming 
to enhance environmental security in another dimension by specifically addressing deforesta-
tion on river banks and hillsides through recognition that this was a cause of increased flood-
ing and landslides (Teplyakov et al 1998:  5-7). Again illustrating that nineteenth century Eu-
rope was grappling with sustainable development long before it entered the political lexicon, 
this remains a pressing issue for many developing countries today. 
 
For the neo-Malthusian’s the ultimate solution to the problem of resource depletion was be-
yond better management and required addressing demand as well as supply by curbing over-
population. Hence population control subsequently became a central plank of the rise of polit-
ical ecology and a major international political concern in the late 1960s and early ‘70s. How-
ever, birth control was also a central proscription of Malthus, before overpopulation concerns 
receded with industrialization and modernization serving to both increase supply and reduce 
demand. One particular manifestation of this Malthusian thinking was as clear a case of a dis-
astrous environmental insecurity afflicting Europe as you could find: the Irish famine of the 
1840s. Over a million people perished after potato blight near-eliminated the country’s staple 
food crop.  What was particularly striking about this tragedy was that it occurred in the 
world’s richest country since Ireland had been united with Great Britain at the start of the 
century. It also occurred at a time when Ireland was exporting grain to a rapidly expanding 
and liberalizing global economy. For Malthus the ‘ignorance and barbarism of the people’ 
(Malthus 1803: 291-292) had led them to have too many children and be overly-reliant on the 
potato. After an initially interventionist response from London under the Peel government, 
the successor Russel administration were won over by this Malthusian logic and ceased send-
ing relief across the Irish Sea through concerns that this would undermine the capacity of 
market forces to respond to the food shortfall. That the Irish were over-reliant on the potato 
was undoubtedly true but this ignores the fact that this was born of necessity rather than 
choice since the post-colonial persistence of a feudal system of land ownership left the peas-
ants to farm on poorer soils fit only for tubers whilst their landlords grazed cattle and grew 
wheat. In fact, Malthus himself did recognize that the division of Irish land was a contribu-
tory factor to the famine (ibid).  
 
Elsewhere in Europe potato blight exacerbated by feudal land ownership was a contributory 
factor to the fermenting of political discord that particularly manifested itself in the 1848 
‘Year of Revolutions’. The heightened environmental insecurity of peasants experiencing un-
necessary food shortages allied to increased enclosures into common lands they could previ-
ously utilize, due to  their appropriation by the aristocracy, proved a trigger for revolts and 
the genesis of both nationalism and socialism across much of the continent. Uprisings across 
the Austro-Hungarian empire, Prussia, France, Denmark, Poland, the Italian states and else-
where shook the continent at a time when the ‘Concert of Europe’ seemed to have created a 
golden era of both continental order and global dominance. Hence in the middle of the 19th 
Century both human and state security were clearly at stake as a consequence of the central 
environmental and political question of equitable resource management.  
 
The uncharacteristically cordial diplomatic atmosphere of the Concert of Europe system that 
was created after the Napoleonic wars provided the opportunity for the pioneering collective 
co-management of some key resources. The world’s first Intergovernmental Organization the 
Rhine Commission, established at the Congress of Vienna 1815 came to embrace 
conservation measures as it evolved through the century. Initially driven by the commercial 
utilitarianism of setting a common toll for Europe’s premier trade route, the landmark 
organization later came to have some important conservational dimensions. In particular, the 
1868 Mannheim Convention updated the original founding treaty to prohibit the dumping of 
waste into the river. This agreement was initially more about negating navigational disruption 
than ensuring water quality but, in an early illustration of political spillover, the regime later 
came also to address this. The 1885 Treaty on the Regulation of Salmon Fishery was a first 
clear instance of this as were more explicitly environmental measures later enacted by the 
parties in the twentieth century (Kiss 1985). 
.  
 
Outside of Europe, but within its geopolitical reach, the 1893 Pacific Fur Seal Arbitration 
sowed the seeds of global judicial and environmental law when the UK and US agreed to 
avoid a dispute over the Bering Sea north of Canada and Alaska escalating into war. The US 
had taken to intercepting British seal hunting vessels outside of their territorial waters 
through frustration that their former colonial masters were undermining their domestic 
attempts to avoid the extinction of this valuable sea mammal. The landmark arbitration panel 
of independent jurists found in the UK’s favour (5 to 2). Whilst, ostensibly, this ruling was a 
triumph for sovereignty and commercial freedom over conservation, the latter was 
nevertheless boosted in the panel’s further recommendations. The parties agreed to the future 
co-management of the high sea including restrictions on hunting methods and a closed 
season. This agreement was later codified in a 1911 Treaty and also set a precedent for 
international conservation measures thereafter (Sands, Peel & MacKenzie (2012); Byers 
(2013)).  
 
Whilst industrialization, modernization and scientific advance sealed European global 
dominance and averted Malthusian overpopulation fears, these developments also brought 
new threats to these countries as unprecedented stresses on resources and societies came to be 
exerted. Millions of Europe’s citizens died and many of its states were compelled to reform 
or die as a consequence of the mismanagement of the continent’s resources. The unifications 
of Germany and Italy, and the later break-up of the Habsburg Empire, Irish independence  
and Russian Revolution can be connected to this most fundamental of all political and 
environmental concerns. A link between environmental resource management and security in 
19th Century Europe could hardly be more explicit.  
 
4.2 Pollution 
As with resource depletion, the heightened threats posed by pollution became starkly 
apparent in industrializing Europe and North America. Over a century before the 
phenomenon formed the vanguard of the political ecology movement in Europe acid rain was 
identified by British chemist Robert Angus Smith in 1859 and subsequently campaigned 
about by foresters and scientists in Germany (where Angus Smith had previously lived and 
studied) in the 1860s (Reed 2014; Dominick 1992). Similarly, the science of climate change 
was established as early as 1896. Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius, later a Nobel Prize 
winner, published a paper which can lay claim to have established the link between fossil fuel 
emissions and global warming (Arrhenius 1896). Human-induced climate change was not 
portrayed as a security threat by Arrhenius but the fact that the link between industrialization 
and environmental change was identified over 120 years ago is instructive if we consider how 
appropriate action on the dire human consequences of this today is hampered by industrialists 
and politicians wilfully ignoring this for supposed national interests.   
 
As the countries at the forefront of the industrial revolution- and the scientific advances and 
social changes associated with this- Britain, Germany and Sweden also pioneered 
environmental policy in Europe. In Britain the Alkali Act was enacted in 1863 due to 
recognition that the booming Leblanc soda production process was filling the atmosphere 
with hydrochloric acid and, in recognition of his role in identifying this, Angus Smith was 
appointed head of the Alkali Inspectorate set up to implement new industrial restrictions 
(Reed 2014). In a similar illustration of the catalytic effect of scientific discoveries on 
environmental policy still evident today, the Public Health Acts of 1848, 1872 and 1875 and 
the River Pollution Prevention Act of 1876 followed the establishment of the link between 
water pollution and cholera in Britain by Dr John Snow. Five major public inquiries fed into 
the 1876 Act to establish solid grounds for imposing costs on British industry to develop 
clean technology (Pontin 2014: 766). In Germany the Technische Anleitung Luft in 1895 was 
a clean air act passed by the Reich which, in keeping with the new state’s devolved political 
system, permitted stricter than federal restrictions on industry to be imposed by Lander (Hanf 
& Jansen 1998: 278-9). Sweden introduced its first Public Health Act in 1874, establishing 
Public Health Boards in all major towns to monitor water and air quality, and Finland 
followed suit five years later. Pharmaceutical advances in France, led by Louis Pasteur, also 
made great contributions to advances in public health across Europe although a strong role 
for the French state did not manifest itself until the 20th Century. Across the continent the fact 
that the Industrial Revolution required taming in spite of its huge contribution to economic 
growth was well-established by the end of the 19th Century.  
 These pioneering anti-pollution measures are somewhat neglected in the analysis of 
environmental policy because they were not ecocentric. However, these public health 
interventions were acts related to environmental security in so far that they were protecting 
the air and water in ways that were contrary to economic interests for the sake of human and 
state security. The primary motivation for contemporary policy on climate change, ozone 
depletion or pollution in general is essentially the same. This use of scientific reason to meet 
the human interest was in line with the utilitarianism of Bentham and the Liberals, 
particularly prevalent in Britain in this age (Pontin 2014). At the same time, in line with 
emergent social security legislation in Sweden, Britain and particularly Germany, these 
measures can equally be construed as politically conservative. Along with new social security 
measures protecting workers, these ‘Bismarckian welfare’ reforms from above intended to 
prevent revolution from below. This is somewhat akin to recent Chinese anti-pollution 
measures driven both by scientific comprehension of the human cost and governmental 
appreciation of the potential political costs of emerging urban discontent at growing smog 
levels. In 2013 the Chinese government, clearly responding to rising protest, announced a 
package of significant anti-pollution policies aimed at reducing key emissions by 30% over 
the next four years announcing: ‘smog is visible and affects the life of everyone, rich and 
poor. It has been proven that environmental crises can stir controversy and greatly undermine 
social stability’ (Coonan 2013).   
 
 
5. Environmental Securitization via nationalism 
Along with major scientific advances, European industrialization manifested itself in the rise 
of nationalism as modernizing societies came to be more aware of their and other identities 
through state socialization (such as via education or conscription) and communications 
advances. This construction of national identities often particularly featured the glorification 
of the domestic landscape and romanticization of traditional rural culture. Thus the 
environment came to be valued by the state to a much greater degree than seen before and, to 
some extent, securitized. Hence the political right and aristocracy came to be more clearly 
associated with the advance of the politics of conservation in Britain, Germany, Scandinavia 
and elsewhere in the late 19th Century. In spite of peasant insecurities in the face of food and 
land shortages, conservation became chiefly an elitist ‘top-down’ movement, quite distinct 
from the more bottom–up middle class green new social movement that emerged from the 
1960s.  
 
In Britain this ‘environmental nationalism’ chiefly manifested itself around the preservation 
of lakes and village greens threatened by industrialization whilst in Germany deforestation 
was the key concern. Foster-Lloyd’s ‘tragedy of the commons’ found expression in Britain in 
the Commons Preservation Society, established in 1865 by Robert Hunter, who later 
established the still influential conservationist group the National Trust. In 1883 the artistic 
and literary giant John Ruskin established the Lake District Defence Society which succeeded 
in restricting rail construction in England’s most picturesque countryside. Ruskin, with fellow 
aesthete William Morris, also led the ‘Back to Nature’ movement which sought to challenge 
the whole notion of industrialization. Even more elitist in character than these proto-
socialists, the leading Conservative politician of the age Benjamin Disraeli pioneered the 
Young England movement which, very much in keeping with the logic of the tragedy of the 
commons, equated the importance of  property rights with the responsible stewardship of the 
land by the aristocracy (Pepper, Webster & Revill 2003: 135-139). In a similar vein, Forestry 
Schools came to be established by German gentry, which later merged into the influential 
Congress of German Foresters in 1872 as part of their national unification process.  
 
For the Norwegians their mountains were what lakes were for the English and the forests 
were for the Germans. Den Norske Turistforening (DNT) (The Norwegian Mountain Touring 
Association) was founded in 1868 in the fertile period of romantic nationalism after gaining 
independence from Denmark and prior to divorcing from Sweden. Ostensibly set up to 
promote tourism, DNT became a vehicle for projecting Norwegian national identity through 
the preservation and promotion of their unique landscape. In particular, DNT campaigned 
against the construction of hydro-electric dams and bought the legal rights to several 
waterfalls in order to preserve them (Van Koppen & Markham 2007). Italian nationalism also 
both romanticized and sought to tame their Apennine ‘spine’ and its peoples (Debarbieux 
2011). In the US and other white settler states independence and national unity also came to 
be expressed via nature. The pioneering spirit underpinning this form of nationalism often 
equated human colonization with the conquest of nature (Garden 2014: 72, Kaufman 1998). 
 
 
More clearly ecocentric whilst still a product of agrarian romanticism and patrician 
conservatism, was the emergence of policy for the preservation of birds in the 19th Century, 
which enjoyed the patronage of the aristocracy. In Britain the Sea Birds Preservation Act of 
1869 was sponsored by Percy Duke of Northumberland. The Wild Birds Protection Act 1880 
and later launch of the RSPB resulted from concerns at the possible extinction of birds 
favoured for hunting and plumage in hats was led by wealthy women Emily Williamson and 
Eliza Phillips. Similarly, in Germany the Bird Protection Bill of 1890 had the regal backing 
of the Hohenzollerns   
 This elitist, nationalistic and statist environmentalism of the nineteenth century is quite 
distinct ideologically from the transnational, socially-oriented political ecology of the late 
20th Century. However, in terms of appreciating the evolution of the politics and security of 
the environment, this elevation of nature is of relevance.  On one level  the RSPB and 
Hohenzollerns were seeking to secure birds for the bird’s sake (though also for their aesthetic 
value). On another level conservation came to be seen by the state as in the national interest; 
in material or aesthetic terms (Zwierlein 2018). Most pertinently in security terms this wave 
of ‘naturalistic nationalism’ (Kaufman 1998) paved the way for the environment to be raised 
in prominence in the power politics of war and imperialism to which we will ow turn.  
 
 
6. Environmental Securitization via Military Ecocide 
The rise of nationalism and the associated nationalization and glorification of warfare in 
nineteenth century Europe also served to exacerbate these emergent questions of 
environmental depletion and pollution. The scale of the Napoleonic Wars raised the stakes in 
European inter-state rivalry and laid the foundations of total war as whole nations became 
embroiled in the war effort. The industrialization of warfare heightened the insecurity of 
resources and also saw the environment become more central in military strategy.  
 
Scorched earth tactics date back to ancient warfare but were refined and even revered in the 
Napoleonic era as war industrialized and nationalized. The ‘backs to the wall’ tactic of 
destroying your own resources to prevent an invading enemy making use of them became a 
particularly prominent military strategy. Most notoriously, Russian forces in 1812 retreated 
from the invading French army whilst destroying their own arable lands in an ultimately 
successful strategy that paved the way for Napoleon’s disastrous ‘retreat from Moscow’, 
which sowed the seeds of his downfall. This Russian strategy was learned from British 
military leader Wellington who two years earlier, in alliance with Portuguese guerrilla forces, 
had resisted a French invasion in the Peninsular War in a similar manner.  French military 
power was build on its arable supremacy, allowing her to feed the biggest army in Europe, 
and this had come to be realized by those on the receiving end of her autarky (Hough 2016). 
 
European imperialists also came to use systematic military ecocide, offensively rather than 
defensively, in the suppression of colonial insurgencies within their empires. The British 
employed such tactics in suppressing the 1817-18 Sri Lankan Great Rebellion-and again at 
the end of the century in the  2nd Boer War against Dutch settlers in the power struggle over 
South Africa. Such methods also came to be deployed defensively by colonials such as in the 
1812-13  South American War of Independence by Argentine patriots defending against the 
Spanish / Royalists (Hough 2016). Weaponizing water or scorching the earth is contrary to 
the ethical codes of most non-European cultures, including Islamic, Buddhist and Hindu. 
Hence imperialism came to epitomize culture clashes between the industrialization, 
modernization and free trade of the Europeans and the ecocentricism of much of the rest of 
the world.    
 
7. Environmental Securitization via Imperialism 
As with domestic policy, a combination of government pragmatism and influential scientific 
opinion was responsible for the advance of environmental policies in the context of 
imperialism in the nineteenth century, when Europe dominated the globe like no time before 
or since. Whilst the ecocidal taming of perceived savagery, both human and non-human, 
characterised many imperial conquests there was also an observable trend for a maturing of 
colonial systems so that they became more sustainable in both an economic and political 
sense. A Malthusian appreciation of the finite nature of resources, particularly in terms of the 
relationship between timber and naval power, was one dimension of this. In addition the 
rising science of botany came to be linked to both the exploration of new lands and the 
management of existing colonies (Grove 1995). In the late 18th Century British explorer 
James Cook’s legendary voyages charting Australia and the South Pacific included Joseph 
Banks and Johann Reinhold Forster, the leading British and Prussian botanists of their day.  
Cook himself was a cartographer and astronomer and this merging of science and exploration 
in cross-national ventures became a general feature of European imperialism. In particular, a 
professional appreciation of the flora and fauna of colonies and the world in general hence 
became a component of imperial rule.  
 
As also foretold in Cook’s voyages, the transnational nature of emerging epistemic 
communities of botanists came to manifest itself in a significant degree of cross-imperial 
learning. The development of botanical gardens on Mauritius by the French from the 18th 
Century, aiming to conserve species, were imitated by British governors and botanists in the 
East India Corporation and in a major experiment on the remote Atlantic island of St Helena 
(Grove 1995: 332-242).  St Helena was chosen consciously as a conduit between India and 
the West Indies to facilitate imperial exchanges of crops and in order to learn about 
conservation, climate and reforestation.  In particular, William John Burchell, botanist at St 
Helena and then in India researched links between deforestation and soil erosion and 
flooding. At around the same time the governor Alexander Beatson (an open admirer of the 
18th Century French governor of Mauritius Pierre Poivre) demonstrated a very early 
appreciation of climate change in noting the increased prominence of droughts across the 
world (Grove 1995: 358). Beatson was as much a scientist as a colonial administrator and his 
work ‘Tracts’ is known to have influenced Charles Darwin, whose ‘Origin of the Species’ 
cites evidence from St Helena on the impact of encroachment by human and other life forms 
on ecosystems.  Environmental degradation was more readily observable on lush, isolated 
islands than the urbanizing European landscape. Prior to Darwin the greatest naturalist of his 
age, the Prussian Alexander Von Humboldt- an associate of Banks and Forster- , linked South 
American deforestation to European colonizers.  
 
By felling the trees which cover the tops and sides of the mountains, men in all 
climates seem to bring upon future generations two calamities at once; want of fuel 
and a scarcity of water. (Von Humboldt 1819: 143) 
 
Whilst it was more common to blame the pre-modern ignorance of indigenous peoples for 
resource depletion in the European colonies and neo-European colonies (such as the US, 
Australia and New Zealand) some cross-cultural learning also took place as the ingrained 
sustainability of local cultures became appreciated. Oneness with nature characterized many 
of the cultures of Europe’s imperial subjects, such as the Hindus, Buddhists and Native 
Americans and this came to be appreciated and appropriated. Hence we can see some 
instances of the traditional knowledge of colonials being valued. The French and British in 
Canada, for instance, learned the arts of sustainable beaver fur trapping from working with 
indigenous peoples (Beinart & Hughes 2007: 41).  In addition to imperial learning, 
conservation sometimes came to be employed as part of efforts to appear to be good 
colonialists. For example, the Dutch in Indonesia introduced conservation measures for the 
Bird of Paradise, whose plumage was in demand for European fashion, in response to local 
protests (Cribb 2007: 54).  
More clearly linking with contemporary political ecology and its emphasis on economic 
structures, Burchell’s work in St Helena and India led him to draw parallels between 
enslavement and environmental degradation (Grove 1995: 350).  The extinction of the dodo 
in the 17th Century and pioneering conservation experiments in the 18th Century provide 
contrasting faces of imperialism but the correlation between resources and empire is explicit.    
 
8. Conclusions 
Environmental security long predates its popularization from the 1990s or the rise of political 
ecology from the 1960s. Like many global issues, environmental concerns experienced 
something of an interregnum in the total war era of the twentieth century. The gap between 
the 1860s and 1960s is a somewhat artificial one. In much the same way international 
terrorism did not originate with Middle Eastern skyjackers in the 1960s- or Bin Laden in the 
1990s- so much as with disparate anarchist assassins of the late 19th Century who, both 
protested against and utilized the opportunities provided by a technologically and socially 
modernizing world. Geopolitical globalization served to obscure the technological and social 
globalization that continued from its emergence in the 19th century through to the conclusion 
of the Cold War. However, during this time the environmental costs of pollution and resource 
depletion continued to accrue with both human and national security implications. The 
environmentalists who emerged from the 1960s and globalized from the 1990s are socially 
and politically distinct from many of their 19th Century forbearers but the basis of their 
support and impact is still quite similar: the human and national security implications of 
environmental degradation. 
 
The concept of environmental security has struggled to achieve the currency it deserves in the 
present age given that over 8 million people a year are killed by pollution and many more are 
threatened by the worsening of the current climate crisis. This has much to do with the word 
security coming to be co-opted by 20th Century militarism. Moving beyond this mindset 
would help properly conceptualize and politically prioritize such global problems. 
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